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When it comes to social and cultural histories of capitalism, we know a lot more about how 
people spent their money than how they invested it.1 The institutions and practices of 
nineteenth-century consumer society – the department stores, the development of the 
advertising industry, the democratization of luxury – have been thoroughly mapped out by 
scholars since the 1990s.2 Yet while spending and investing are easily imagined as opposites 
– one representing the indulgence of gratification, the other its deferral – a culture of 
investment was developing in late Victorian Britain which appealed to similar desires and 
emotions as were played upon by consumer capitalism. In the same way that advertisers, 
manufacturers, and retailers were creating mass markets for consumer goods, so other actors 
were using innovative methods to appeal to small investors, widening participation in 
financial markets.  
This culture has been obscured by a focus on the London Stock Exchange. Though 
becoming the center not only of the national but also the international securities market, the 
London Stock Exchange was distinguished by its “neglect of the small investor.”3 Its 
stockbrokers preferred larger clients: they were more likely to pay their debts, required less 
attention, and were more lucrative than smaller clients, since the broker’s main income 
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derived from a percentage commission on each transaction. Thus, they did not advertise – 
indeed the rules of the London Stock Exchange forbade it – acquiring new business through 
personal introductions from existing clients. Provincial stock exchanges tended to follow this 
lead, also imposing advertising bans on its members, limiting their ability to reach new 
investors. This conservatism imposed limits on the “democratization” of stock ownership.4  
Yet, if we look beyond the official market, we glimpse a different picture. The 
enclosure of the London Stock Exchange at the beginning of the nineteenth century created a 
distinction between “inside” and “outside” stockbrokers. Anyone unwilling or unable to meet 
the Stock Exchange’s membership requirements was free to do business outside.5 The 
activities of these outsiders occasionally surface in histories of the London Stock Exchange, 
particularly at moments of conflict between members and non-members. By necessity, 
however, they feature as bit-players, peripheral to the main story of the growth of the official 
exchanges.6 They have occasionally attracted more sustained attention. In a pioneering 
article, David Itzkowitz shows how in the late Victorian period outside brokers borrowed 
methods from professional bookmakers, using “aggressive advertising” and sensational 
appeals to introduce speculation to a wider audience.7 Dilwyn Porter provides an equally 
valuable survey of the varied ways in which outsiders targeted inexperienced investors from 
the 1880s to the start of the Second World War.8 Important though this work is, it 
conceptualizes outside brokers as disreputable and dishonest adjuncts to the “real” market for 
stocks and shares, whose main – if unintentional – impact was to legitimize the established 
exchanges. Porter, for example, though recognizing the diversity of outside firms and noting 
that some behaved honorably, focuses on the fraudulent among their number, the “parasitic 




Alternative approaches are possible, however. Kieran Heinemann has recently made a 
persuasive case for focusing on “the fringes of financial markets” as a “legitimate and vibrant 
entry point for investment newcomers.” He explores this theme in relation to what he calls 
the “grey market for stocks and shares” after the First World War, in which outside brokers 
were prominent.10 His analysis is complemented by an article by Matthew Hollow in this 
journal which documents the “share-pushing” activities of outsiders in the interwar period.11 
Though sharing Porter’s focus on fraud, he uses the activities of outsiders to map the 
financial advice landscape and explore how investors, particularly new investors, navigated 
the market. Looking more closely at market outsiders can indeed give new perspectives on 
how participation in the market was extended, but in this article, I suggest that the late 
Victorian years provide an even better vantage point from which to observe this process. This 
was the period that first saw the outside broker rise to prominence, with a raft of outsiders 
challenging the hegemony of established operators. Their continuing success into the interwar 
period rested largely on a refinement of practices pioneered from the late 1870s. 
Itzkowitz compares outside brokers to bookmakers, but an alternative analogy can be 
found in the market for consumer goods. Borrowing techniques from entrepreneurial 
contemporaries like William Lever and Thomas Barratt, outside brokers developed a mass 
market, not for soap, but for speculation.12 Though outnumbered by insiders, they leveraged 
their advantages to transform the market for stocks and shares. Their blanket advertising 
brought the stock market to the attention of new ranks of potential investors, making it a 
subject of curiosity. Their active branching policy moved investment out of the City of 
London and made it more accessible to larger numbers of people. Their information and 
advice services promised to demystify the markets for the masses. Outside brokers became 
high-profile figures whose visibility made them the public face of the stock market, despite 
having no official connection with the London Stock Exchange. Thus, despite their persistent 
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association with fraudulent practices, they became hugely influential intermediaries who 
shaped many people’s understanding of and engagement with the market.  
As others have observed, researching outside brokers poses problems.13 Relatively 
few collections of stockbrokers’ papers survive in the archives, and those that exist are of 
inside rather than outside brokers. But a detailed picture of their activities can be pieced 
together from nineteenth-century newspapers and periodicals, which contain not only their 
advertisements, but also news stories, editorial comment, advice columns, readers’ letters, 
and court reports involving outside brokers. Yet these materials contain pitfalls: unpicking 
the financial agendas influencing newspaper coverage can be difficult; legal reports, though 
furnishing some of the richest material on outside brokers, may not be entirely representative 
of their business practices. The research strategy has been to read as widely as possible across 
the newspaper and periodical press, encompassing the diversity of titles which reported on or 
carried advertisements for outside brokers, and assessing both critical and sympathetic 
comment.14 Other sources have been used: although brokers’ circulars do not survive in large 
quantities, their investment manuals do, and these give important insights into their appeal to 
investors.15 Finally, the records of the London Stock Exchange and the Exchange Telegraph 
Company contain many useful references to the activities of outsiders. 
This article uses these sources to re-evaluate the significance of outside brokers, 
exploring their methods and the reasons for their success. The first section briefly sketches 
the growth of the outsiders’ business and the resulting backlash from the later 1880s. The rest 
of the article attempts to explain why, despite a moral panic about these outsiders, they were 
able to thrive for so long. The second section surveys the various methods of communication 
used by the brokers, showing how they harnessed the power of print to reach wide 
constituencies of potential investors. The third focuses on how outsiders helped to recalibrate 
attitudes, blurring the boundaries between investment, speculation, and gambling, recasting 
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playing the stock market as an exciting but safe and legitimate activity. The fourth explores 
why these methods inspired trust, and the fifth assesses the complex relationship between the 
inside and outside markets. The conclusion suggests the wider implications of studying 
financial “fringes” for understanding capitalism. Histories of the stock market tend to draw 
on official sources of publicly quoted securities and their holders. This work has provided us 
with a rich and quantitatively precise view of the growth of the stock market, tracing who 
invested and what they invested in.16 But it does not provide the whole picture, and this 
article is an attempt to bring into view a hidden but important side of this market. 
 
The Rise of the Outsiders  
 
The market for stocks and shares was originally an open market, conducted in a variety of 
locations, including the Royal Exchange, the Rotunda of the Bank of England, and, most 
famously, the coffee houses of the City of London. Though the City Corporation possessed 
powers to license stockbrokers, the trade was in fact carried on by a mix of “sworn” and 
“unsworn” brokers.17 Moves towards creating a closed market, culminating in the 
establishment of a members-only Stock Exchange in 1801, did not create a monopoly.18 
Trade continued outside “the House,” with a host of brokers, dealers, and auctioneers making 
up a diverse financial market. And when stock exchanges began to form in the larger towns 
and cities from the 1830s, the inside-outside dynamic was replicated across the country.19  
Initially attracting little attention, outsiders first gained a higher profile during the 
“railway mania” of the 1840s. Going by many names – “stags, outside men, third class train, 
or stand ups” – they specialized in buying and selling letters of allotment for railway shares, a 
trade which took place in the alley outside the Stock Exchange. They were considered 
“disreputable dealers”, and their main occupation was “plundering” small tradesmen and 
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“other unfortunate individuals.”20 But outsiders were mainly known for their association with 
the market for mining shares. Domestic mines had been neglected by the London Stock 
Exchange because of their distance from the capital, their unpredictability, and the difficulty 
of getting reliable information on them, allowing the field to be dominated by outside 
dealers.21 The tendency of these dealers also to be involved in company promotion and 
management created conflicts of interest which gave them a dubious reputation. Accused of 
manipulating share prices, misrepresenting the prospects of mining ventures, and seeking to 
offload overpriced shares onto unwary investors, one such dealer admitted in 1853 that the 
public saw them as “little better than card swindlers.”22  
But from the 1870s, a growing number of ambitious outside brokers were shedding 
their association with the mining share market, recasting themselves as general stock and 
share brokers. They were encouraged by a range of factors that were beginning to make 
investment in stocks and shares a viable proposition for greater numbers, including the wider 
availability of investments with limited liability, lower share denominations, rising incomes 
for growing numbers of white-collar workers, and reforms to married women’s property 
rights.23 Another factor was the arrival of the new technology of the “tape.” Prices of stocks 
were telegraphed from the London Stock Exchange to receiving machines in brokerages 
across London which printed them on a spool of paper. The “ticker,” as it was sometimes 
known on account of the sound it made when in action, had been adopted by the New York 
Stock Exchange in December 1867, and started operation in London five years later, 
following the formation of the Exchange Telegraph Company.24  
Both inside and outside brokers subscribed to the tape service, but only outsiders 
realized its transformative potential, often taking on multiple machines, making them freely 
available to their clients, and making this a central element of their sales pitch. The 
continuous supply of prices represented a significant step towards the mechanization of stock 
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dealing, increasing the speed and reliability of transactions. And it provided the raw materials 
for speculation. Customers would select which stock they wanted to operate in, and whether 
they wanted to speculate for a rise (a “bull”) or for a fall (a “bear”). They then deposited 
“cover,” which could be as little as one per cent of the value of the stock, together with 
commission of 1/16th (6.25%). This meant that just £5 6s 3d “commanded” £500 stock, in the 
language of the brokers, while those with £21 5s to risk could “command” £2,000 stock. If a 
client was “bulling” a stock, and the tape price went up by one percent, they could close the 
transaction, pocketing the difference and their cover – or keep it open hoping for even bigger 
profits. If the stock went down by one per cent, their cover “ran off” and the transaction 
ended. By the end of 1885, the Exchange Telegraph Company was supplying 140 tape 
machines to non-members.25 
But the proliferation of this type of speculation generated anxieties which threatened 
to overtake the outside brokers. By the mid-1880s, with close to 200 outside firms doing 
business in the capital, outside brokers had become a frequent subject of hostile comment.26 
The press had long been a key reputation broker in the financial markets, and there were no 
shortage of voices willing to challenge the rise of the outside brokers.27 For critics, 
speculation on the cover system was gambling, pure and simple. Those who did it were not 
actually investing in the stock market, they pointed out, but gambling on price movements. 
Moreover, it was a rigged gamble. Whereas inside brokers were the agents of their clients, 
outside brokers were effectively principals in their transactions with customers, much like 
bookmakers and punters. In other words, when their customers lost – when the cover ran off 
– they won. Therefore, they had every incentive to make sure this happened. Those who 
risked their money in this way “lose their money, probably, nineteen times out of twenty.”28 
When growing pressure of competition between outsiders led several of them to begin 
offering commission-free dealing, critics presented this as a dangerous deception designed to 
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tempt the unwary with a veneer of fake philanthropy.29 And whilst dealing with an inside 
broker meant having recourse to the London Stock Exchange’s Committee for General 
Purposes in the event of a dispute, those dealing with outsiders had no such protections.  
Outside brokerages were increasingly stigmatized as “bucket shops,” a term 
originating in the US for low-class drinking houses, but which had come to be applied to 
brokerages competing with the Chicago Board of Trade, and which quickly made its way 
over the Atlantic.30 Newspapers warned their readers against the bucket shop menace.31 By 
the early 1890s, disquiet had developed into a full-blown moral panic with calls for 
legislative intervention. In 1893, the recently formed National Anti-Gambling League began 
working with former Attorney General, Sir Richard Webster, to draw up a bill to define 
outside brokerages as common gaming houses and therefore illegal under the terms of the 
1845 Gaming Act.32 Though this came to nothing, outside brokers who misappropriated their 
clients’ money could be criminally prosecuted, and judges in both criminal and civil actions 
often commented in scathing terms about the business practices of the outsiders.33 
Increasingly worried about the competition they posed, as well as possible 
reputational damage, the London Stock Exchange took steps against the outsiders. In 1885 
the Committee for General Purposes tried to block the supply of tape prices which sustained 
the outsiders’ business by expelling the Exchange Telegraph Company from the floor of the 
House. This proved ineffective, however, as the company simply set up shop just outside the 
Exchange where it was able to continue sourcing prices from members as they came and 
went. After eighteen months, its operatives were readmitted to the House. But anxieties about 
competition persisted, and in 1893 the Committee tried a different strategy, requiring the 
Exchange Telegraph Company to stop supplying prices to outside brokers.34 But cutting off 
the outsiders did not curb them for long, and they continued to flourish into the 1930s. It was 
only legislative interference that eventually ended their operations.35 
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How outside brokers were able to win and maintain trust in the face of copious press 
criticism, the hostility of judges, and the opposition of the London Stock Exchange requires 
some explanation. For contemporaries, the irrationality of the public, particularly small 
investors, was to blame. The Times was representative when in an 1898 editorial it wondered 
at the persistence of “human credulity” in the modern age. Seeing similarities between 
outside brokers and patent medicine vendors, the fact both were able to get rich by promising 
“short cuts to health and wealth” was proof of the enduring “gullibility” of the public, 
resistant to experience and reasoning alike.36 Even if not sharing the condescension of such 
judgements, historians have perhaps not done enough to challenge their underlying 
assumptions, leaving us with a somewhat skewed perspective. Conceiving of outsiders as 
essentially fraudulent and their victims as fools creates an overly-simplistic dichotomy 
between honest insiders and crooked outsiders which whitewashes official exchanges, 
obscuring some of their own problematic practices. It also fails to take into account important 
characteristics of the information landscape in which investors operated. And, by focusing on 
character traits rather than states, it pays insufficient attention to important drivers of 
investment behavior. As scholars are increasingly insisting, framing discussions of behavior 
in terms of “rationality” and “irrationality” is somewhat limiting if we want to fully 
understand the contexts in which decisions were made.37  
 
The Power of Print 
 
Inside brokers had an effective system for bringing in new business. They employed hosts of 
agents – variously called “touts,” “runners,” “remisiers,” and most frequently “half-
commission men” – to win them new clients, sharing the commission with them. Well-
connected young men would haunt the West End clubs, “where they ‘preyed’ on relatives, 
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old school friends, and the like for business.”38 Likewise, brokers split commission with 
banks, accountants, lawyers, and members of the provincial stock exchanges. Thus, investors 
could do business with an inside broker without having any direct contact with him. However 
extensive this system was – and one Edwardian journalist estimated that there were around 
20,000 such agents in operation – it was not sufficient to monopolize the stock and share 
business for the insiders.39 Relying upon personal, face-to-face relations rather than 
exploiting the growing power of print, there were natural limits to its reach. Those who did 
not encounter an agent for an inside broker were increasingly likely to discover one of the 
growing ranks of outside brokers who were making themselves visible through modern 
advertising methods. 
Spurred on by the repeal of the “taxes on knowledge” between 1853 and 1861, the 
second half of the nineteenth century witnessed “an exponential growth in the number of 
places where news was read and bought.”40 As well seeing the establishment of new titles, 
newspapers were now published more often, with a big increase in dailies, and they were 
getting cheaper, with penny papers becoming more available from the 1860s.41 The 
significant increases in circulation which lower prices brought about also enabled newspapers 
to grow in size, offering more pages for the same low price. Advertising, always crucial to 
the economics of the press, became even more so in an age of intensifying competition and 
shrinking margins on sales. New titles scrabbled to win advertisers, who were thus able to 
leverage generous terms.42  
Though they had long used the press, outside brokers capitalized on these changes to 
begin advertising more consistently and more extensively from the 1850s. Often bunched 
together in the advertising columns, their notices represented in effect an “investors’ corner” 
catching the eye of anyone with money to place.43 Advertising brokers were also paying more 
attention to sales techniques, using eye-catching headlines to attract attention. Thus, a typical 
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advertising column of The Times in May 1860 featured four successive notices, headlined 
“SHARES WANTED,” “PROFITABLE INVESTMENT,” “MINE SHARES for SALE,” and 
“SAFE INVESTMENT” respectively.44 By the 1880s, brokers’ advertisements had become 
more prominent still. Firms like W. Gutteridge and Co., John Shaw, and the Universal Stock 
Exchange were emulating the more ambitious consumer goods firms by taking whole 
columns, then double columns, and eventually even full-page adverts.45 Their advertisements 
colonized every type of newspaper available: the London and provincial press, niche 
publications such as the Civil Service Gazette and the Court Journal, and, of course, the 
burgeoning specialist financial press.46 In some cases, they even began publishing their own 
newspapers.47 Advertising became a major element of these firms’ budgets, with George 
Gregory and Co.’s annual ad spend in the 1890s lying in the region of £30,000.48 While not 
quite matching the most prolific advertisers such as Beecham’s, who by this point were 
spending around £100,000 annually, publicity was clearly as integral to their success as it was 
to manufacturers of pills and soaps, allowing them to reach a national market.49 
Newspapers were just one aspect of the nineteenth-century “explosion of print.”50 
Circulars had long been a means for brokers to communicate with their clients, though print 
runs were modest, and the circulars tended to be little more than price lists.51 However, 
cheaper paper, advances in printing technology, and postal reforms rendered circulars a much 
more effective mass-marketing tool.52 Circulars made up a sizeable part of the astonishing 
441m book packets which were being sent annually by the end of the 1880s.53 Though inside 
brokers were permitted to circularize their clients, they were not allowed to send their 
circulars to strangers, to prevent poaching, a rule which was rigorously enforced by the Stock 
Exchange’s Committee for General Purposes.54 They were therefore prevented from 
employing the services of the growing number of businesses harvesting the names and 
addresses of shareholders from public registers to sell to firms who wanted to reach large 
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numbers of possible investors.55 But outside brokers could and did, notching up huge print 
runs for their circulars, which evolved beyond simple price lists into more sophisticated 
market reports or tip-sheets. One outside firm, John Lenn and Co., by no means one of the 
largest, was sending out up to 50,000 circulars at a time in the mid-1880s.56 
  Print could be exploited in other ways. If newspapers and circulars were relatively 
ephemeral methods of communication, then brokers also produced longer-lasting 
publications. Wanting to reach people who knew nothing about investment, many of them 
produced introductory guides and handbooks giving the history of the Stock Exchange, 
explaining the jargon of the markets, and outlining investment strategies. By the 1880s, most 
of the larger outside firms had at least one such guide, and some were more ambitious, 
George Gregory and Co. offering the public a library of no less than 24 publications by 
1896.57 This period even saw occasional, though significant, sorties into fiction. Both John 
Shaw and George Gregory co-authored fiction with the Victorian hack novelist and barrister 
Bracebridge Hemyng. In 1885, Hemyng published The Stockbroker’s Wife, a collection of 
tales of speculation “edited” by Shaw, while in 1894 he followed up with a novel, A Stock 
Exchange Romance, “edited” by Gregory. These productions enabled brokers to get their 
message across to readers who might not look at the investment ads in the newspaper, but 
who would happily devour a sensational tale, particularly one in which “every commandment 
is broken.”58 
Crucially, the visibility this advertising onslaught conferred on outsiders led many 
novice investors to assume that they were actually members of the London Stock Exchange.59 
This prompted the Stock Exchange’s own foray into print. From 1879 it began publishing an 
annual list of its members in The Times, though proposals to turn this into a weekly list were 
stymied by qualms about the cost.60 But in 1885, with the outside broker threat intensifying, 
the Stock Exchange paradoxically began placing a regular press advertisement informing the 
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public that its members did not advertise, and that investors could obtain a list of members on 
application.61 This was quite a financial commitment, costing around £1,000 annually, and 
initially, it seemed to have an effect. The Secretary to the Committee for General Purposes 
reported in December 1886 that he was receiving an average of seven or eight letters daily as 
a result of the notice and had issued some 1,800 lists to inquirers.62 It seemed that the Stock 
Exchange had successfully turned the outsiders’ greatest weapon – advertising – against 
them. But this was wishful thinking. A list, without any elaboration as to why one name 
rather than another should be selected, was of limited use to new investors. The Secretary 
admitted that many enquirers asked him to recommend a broker, which he was not permitted 
to do. Moreover, the Stock Exchange’s restrained notice had to compete with the altogether 
more interesting fare provided by the outside brokers. Such a half-hearted embrace of 
advertising was unlikely to “attract the attention of investors and speculators,” claimed 
critics.63 Even some within the Stock Exchange recognized that such “a stereotyped 
advertisement … would soon cease to attract any notice.”64 Only one side in this contest was 
using print to its full potential. 
 
Sanitizing Speculation  
 
The outsiders’ exploitation of print conferred other advantages besides visibility. It allowed 
them to influence attitudes and shape debates. Historians have long recognized that the 
expansion of consumer society from the late Victorian period entailed significant cultural 
change alongside economic and institutional innovation. In particular, manufacturers and 
retailers who were developing markets for consumer goods needed to overcome entrenched 
cultural prejudices against credit. “Extravagant spending on luxuries,” Peter Scott explains, 
was “seen as the antithesis of the self-reliance and prudence which underpinned ‘respectable’ 
14 
 
Victorian families.” Marketing campaigns therefore focused on assuaging consumers’ fears 
about “the perceived risks of buying on credit.”65 Similarly, the biggest obstacle to the 
business of the outside brokers was deep-seated resistance to speculation, which informed 
much writing about the stock market. By the later nineteenth century, blanket condemnations 
of speculation on moral grounds had given way to a more class-inflected approach which 
tolerated the activity, but only amongst the wealthy.66 Financial authorities typically adopted 
a paternalistic tone when addressing smaller investors. Francis Playford, one of the very few 
member brokers to pen an advice manual, told his “inexperienced” readers to steer clear of 
time bargains and stick to the Funds as “the safest possible investment.”67 The financial 
journalist A. J. Wilson explained that those of substantial means could legitimately indulge in 
the “perilous luxury” of speculation because they could afford to lose, but the majority had to 
satisfy themselves with “carefully selected stocks of the best class,” even if this meant 
receiving modest returns.68 The message that “high interest means bad security” was 
endlessly drummed into such readers, who were also periodically reminded of Benjamin 
Disraeli’s paean to the “sweet simplicity of the Three Per Cents.”69 There was thus a world of 
difference, rhetorically at least, between risky speculation and steady investment.  
Outside brokers sought to disrupt these distinctions. Though a minority adopted a 
sensationalist sales pitch (as in Reeves & Co.’s 1875 publication How Fortunes are Made on 
the Stock Exchange), the majority sought to invest speculation with the respectable and 
prudential connotations of investment. To begin with, they recommended speculative 
approaches whilst distancing themselves from the word and its toxic connotations. So, in an 
1869 book called Double Your Income, the Omnium Investment Agency reassured readers 
that their object was not “to lead or advise them to speculate in any way whatever,” but to 
help them “to improve their position by the practice of sure and safe principles, without in 
any way trusting their property to the chances of speculation.”70 In time, however, outside 
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brokers sought to sanitize speculation. Their promotional materials increasingly conflated it 
with investment, as with Gutteridge’s Speculation and Investment in Stocks and Shares 
(1882), Percy Campbell’s True Principles of Steady Successful Speculation and Investment 
(1885), and Duncan on Investment and Speculation in Stocks and Shares (1895). Investment 
and speculation, according to the author of the last of these, were “twin sisters, and so nearly 
alike that it is almost impossible to discriminate between them,” since both activities aimed to 
maximize returns and minimize risks. The logical result was a policy of “speculative 
investments.”71 
What helped this message to resonate was the sustained decline in yields on 
government securities that made ultra-cautious approaches to the market less attractive. The 
Crimean War had seen the last major issues of Consols; after this, Gladstonian finance and 
redemption had begun to shrink the national debt. The reduction of yield was formalized in 
1888 when Chancellor of the Exchequer George Goschen created conversion stock bearing 
2¾ per cent interest till 1903, falling to 2½ per cent thereafter.72 Outside brokers warned the 
public that what were once considered risk-free investments in fact carried their own dangers, 
of sacrificing the income that could be obtained by a more active approach to the market. The 
false belief that small interest ensured safety and large interest spelled danger was a fallacy 
“that keeps money idle and moneyed people poorer than they need be.”73 
Though branded as little short of gambling by its critics, speculation on the cover 
system was not presented in this way by outside brokers. Their adverts stressed the prudential 
element – it was “STOCK EXCHANGE SPECULATION ON LIMITED LIABILITY,” and 
“STOCK-EXCHANGE DEALING MADE SAFE.”74 They could do this because although 
the public’s potential profits were limitless, the losses were defined and limited – even if the 
stock fell twenty per cent, they would only lose their one per cent cover. Brokers thus 
recommended this system “with a view of protecting our clients” from the “violent 
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fluctuations” which could occur in times of panic.75 The seeming transparency of the 
liabilities and charges were particularly significant at a time when the opacity of inside 
brokers’ commission rates was a constant cause of complaint.76 As cover was deposited up-
front, it was also a method of dealing which protected the broker against clients who might 
otherwise amass large debts they were unable to pay. This can therefore be seen as the 
financial equivalent of the ready-money, fixed-price system that was transforming the 
shopping experience.77 One of the chief objections to the idea of people of modest means 
speculating – that they could not withstand the risks they ran – was therefore undercut. 
Anyone who could find the £5 or £10 usually advertised as the minimum level of cover could 
become a speculator. The outside brokers therefore claimed that they were democratizing 
finance – opportunities for realizing large returns “were formerly limited to persons in direct 
communication with the City, and involved the handling of large sums of money.” But now a 
wider public could participate, “at any distance, and without interruption to their usual 
pursuits, and … the actual money handled need be but little.”78 Even their staunchest critics 
admitted that the cover system placed speculation “practically within the reach of all.”79  
Just as canny retailers were turning shopping for pleasure into a luxury that could be 
experienced by a mass middle-class audience, so speculation was presented as a form of 
leisure which could be enjoyed in comfort and with one’s respectability intact. The larger 
outside brokers ploughed substantial resources in their offices, expanding them piecemeal as 
neighboring premises became available, mirroring the process by which draper’s shops were 
evolving into department stores.80 In 1884, the Civil Service Gazette described John Shaw’s 
offices as “comfortably, even luxuriously furnished, and clients, or intending clients, would 
find them a most comfortable lounge or resting-place.”81 There, one had free access to 
“telephones, financial journals, record books, and papers.”82 George Gregory went one 
further: his Hints to Speculators and Investors contained fold-out illustrations of his offices in 
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Tokenhouse Buildings, by the Bank of England, depicting respectable middle-class customers 
enjoying what looked more like club rooms, reading newspapers, writing letters, making 
phone calls, and engaging in polite conversation. These illustrations, which gave a “birdseye 
view” of the offices, also reinforced the transparency of Gregory’s business. Readers were 
encouraged to survey the entire space before paying a visit, to reassure themselves that they 
could visit with safety, and quite possibly profit.  
Moreover, whereas inside brokers were not permitted to branch, outside brokers did. 
Both Shaw and Gregory opened branches in popular retail and leisure spots in the West End, 
such as Westbourne Grove in Bayswater, close to Whiteley’s department store, New Oxford 
Street, opposite Mudie’s Library, and on Piccadilly, opposite the recently-constructed 
Pavilion Theatre, an upmarket West End music hall.83 Outsiders were thus responsible for 
bringing speculation out of its confines in the alleyways of the City and into the safer and 
better-known spaces of the fashionable West End. These West End exchanges were 
patronized because they made speculation both convenient and respectable – it could easily 
be integrated into one’s daily routines without loss of face. As journalist, author, and denizen 
of clubland Joseph Hatton, explained,  
You can go in and speculate and gamble, at a rate never dreamt of by those wild, 
tearing, duelling gamesters of Walpole's time: you can do it in cold blood in your 
morning coat, then take a ride in the park, lunch calmly at your club, go home 
unruffled to dinner, and escort your wife to the Opera in the evening, or to a meeting 
at Exeter Hall with the mild air of a bishop.84 
Customers could thus move seamlessly between these different leisure spaces – department 
stores, libraries, clubrooms, and outside brokerages – speculation joining the ranks of at least 
semi-respectable pleasures available to the late-Victorian middle classes. Outside brokerages 
also multiplied in towns and cities across the country. The large London firms opened 
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provincial branches: by the end of 1887, Shaw was operating in Manchester and Brighton, 
while by 1891, Gregory had outlets in Brighton, Hastings, Folkestone, Leeds, and Hull.85 But 
here they faced stiff competition from local offices offering similar services. As early as 
1885, for example, Manchester residents could make “unlimited profits with limited risks” 
with Max Browne & Co. on Market Street, or try their luck with T. P. Edwards on Bank 
Street, who transacted “Stock Exchange Business with Limited Liability.”86 
 Though some accounts gendered speculators as male, outside brokerages had many 
female clients, capitalizing on women’s longstanding involvement in the financial markets.87 
One commentator hinted at a taboo about women entering such spaces, suggesting that “lady 
tapers wait about the city whilst their male friends operate for them,” but it is clear that 
women also participated directly.88 One account described a “bold woman” who typically 
spent the day at her broker’s, sitting “in the room where the tapes tick off the latest quotations 
hour after hour.” Departing ostensibly for lunch, she in fact was on the hunt for information, 
often hurrying back “with a tip that may turn out particularly well.”89 Though men 
preponderated in the illustrations in Gregory’s Hints to Speculators, several female figures 
can also be seen, underlining the idea that women could safely negotiate these spaces. By the 
early 1890s, the Yorkshire Evening Post observed disapprovingly that “the craze for 
gambling with the bucket-shop man is growing amongst women,” with the number of cases 
in the courts involving women on the rise.90 Another editorial even claimed that it was “well 
known in the City that ladies form the bulk of the clientele of ‘bucket shop’ keepers.”91  
 What made speculation even easier is that it did not require constant attendance at the 
broker’s office. It could be conducted by post, telegraph, or – increasingly – telephone, and 
tracked through price lists in the daily newspaper. These facilities made it easy for men and 
women to keep their speculations secret, whether from employers or family members, thus 
mitigating feelings of guilt or shame. As one author noted, people could now “speculate 
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without anyone being the wiser.”92 This brought the stock market into the home, embedding 
it into the rituals of everyday life. “How many serious and revered fathers of families open 
their paper every morning with all the excitement of the baccarat player feverishly watching 
the turn of a card!” wondered the authors of one survey of the Edwardian West End.93 This 





Nevertheless, outside brokers could only legitimize speculation if they could persuade people 
to trust them. To understand how brokers cultivated trust, we need to contextualize decisions 
to invest by looking more closely at the special characteristics of the media they used. 
Discussing the clients of outside brokers, the Financial Times observed that  
The majority of these people would flatly refuse to hand over cash to a casual stranger 
who accosted them in the street and made them flattering offers in return – they 
would, indeed, be inclined to hand him over to the police for trying to obtain money 
by false pretences – but to an exactly similar request made through a newspaper or the 
post they make a ready response, and probably feel pained if they are called fools for 
having done so.94 
Why was this so? The Pall Mall Gazette suggested that it was a question of the relative 
novelty of print. “Mankind has had some thousands of years’ experience of the use and abuse 
of the human voice.” But “[p]ut a thing in print and a thousand men will believe it for one 
who would have believed it had it ever reached them through the ear.” This was particularly 
true of investors, and the paper thought it was “a vain aspiration to hope that men may some 
day be as rational with their eyes as they are with their ears.”95  
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Though identifying an important point, these commentators ultimately exaggerate the 
gullibility of bucket shop customers, missing the key difference between the two methods. 
Whereas the face-to-face approach demands an immediate response, the written appeal 
allows a choice to be made over a period of time. Alan Mackintosh has recently argued that 
this temporal aspect to decision-making was crucial to the success of the much-maligned 
patent medicine trade. He sees the two defining characteristics of such advertising as the 
communication of detailed information and constant reiteration. This enabled “a negotiating 
process” between vendor and customer “which might be lengthy. Consumers expected to see 
the same information several times,” and could assimilate it at their own rate. This meant that 
“a medicine might seem familiar even before any of it had been taken.”96 Outside brokers 
were operating in a very similar way, creating a sense of familiarity – and therefore safety – 
through ubiquity in the press and other media. If readers were not immediately convinced by 
an advertisement, they could ponder the proposition over time, at their own pace, and be 
gradually persuaded. The effect was compounded by the sheer volume of outside broker 
advertising. Though in competition with one another, their advertisements fundamentally 
corroborated each other’s claims, endlessly amplifying and embellishing them so that they 
hardened into received wisdom.  
From familiarity it was a short step to intimacy, for print allowed brokers to simulate 
a personal appeal which helped them win trust in an impersonal market. Though some 
outside brokerages were incorporated as limited companies and adopted an institutional 
persona, many others were organized as partnerships, and foregrounded the personality of 
their proprietors.97 Their advertisements took advantage of the perceived aloofness of inside 
brokers by stressing their approachability and inclusivity, reassuring potential clients that “the 
same attention is given to the smallest operator as to the largest.”98 Whereas inside brokers 
were often wary of giving advice, it was different with outsiders: Shaw’s clients could come 
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and confer with “the intelligent and numerous staff who … are thoroughly experienced and 
well able to advise and enlighten even the dullest of those interested in monetary matters.”99 
Often written in the first person, their advertisements adopted a personable tone; after he 
refurbished and extended his head office, Shaw extended newspaper readers a personal 
invitation: “Should you be in the neighbourhood of Wardrobe-chambers, may I ask you to 
call and see the various improvements that have been recently made?”100 Like many other 
brokers, Shaw offered a discretionary service where clients would send money and he would 
“watch the market closely in order to choose the most favourable opportunity for operating 
on their behalf.”101 His advertisements tried to make “John Shaw” a shorthand for honesty, a 
brand that the public would recognize and trust – “a STRAIGHTFORWARD, 
HONOURABLE, and RESPONSIBLE MAN.”102  
These techniques helped to entrench the idea of the outside broker as not simply a 
businessman but also a friend, adviser, and confidante. George Gregory placed 
advertisements every Christmas wishing season’s greetings to “Clients and Friends.”103 By 
1894 this had evolved into an annual light-hearted poem or short story in which Gregory 
invariably featured, conveying tips and quips to his clientele.104 He even experimented with 
the free gifts which were a common device in the market for consumer goods.105 In 1894 he 
started distributing branded blotting pads, while two years later he grabbed more attention by 
sending a thousand walking canes to clients as a New Year’s gift.106 Moreover, the 
investment guides and manuals which Gregory and his fellow brokers distributed gratis also 
acted as gifts underlining their giver’s benevolence. His ads boasted that he had published 
“for the information and guidance of the investing public more literature than all the members 
of the Stock Exchange put together. … Not being bound by the red tape of the Stock 
Exchange,” he was “able to supply these works to the public free of charge.”107 Such 
strategies highlight the salience of ideas from the field of “emotional finance,” most notably 
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that trust in financial markets is not simply a matter of “rational” calculation but is built on 
stories “weaving together reason and emotion.”108 Having access to personalities like Shaw 
and Gregory as figures of trust helped clients to manage the anxieties generated by decision-
making under conditions of uncertainty.109 
The location of brokers’ advertisements was critical to the project of persuasion. 
Existing scholarship tends to focus on the outsiders’ production of “sham” newspapers which 
“mimicked … mainstream financial publications” but lured readers to buy worthless 
securities.110 More significant, however, was their close relationship with the mainstream 
press, for if their messages were restricted to their own publications, they would have had 
limited wider resonance. As newspaper reading became a habit for growing numbers in the 
later nineteenth century, newspapers were imbricated in the fabric of readers’ everyday lives, 
their serial nature enabling the building of trust over time.111 The relationship was not based 
simply on perceptions of reliability and credibility: newspapers were keen to construct 
“emotional communities” with their readers based on deeper affective bonds.112 
Advertisements thus enjoyed a degree of transferred authority from the medium in which 
they appeared, a shortcut to trust.113 
The most respectable of newspapers were happy to print the advertisements of the 
outsiders, and to give them privileged positions. London dailies like The Standard and the 
Daily News sometimes placed full-column ads for outside brokers directly alongside their 
City articles, while popular society magazines like Truth allowed notices for outsiders to 
appear at the foot of their financial pages.114 This method gave the advertising broker an 
implicit seal of approval. Though these papers may have contained editorial content critical 
of outside brokers – Truth was famed for its exposure of swindling bucket shops alongside 
other fraudsters – the fact that they also carried advertisements for outside brokers blunted the 
criticism.115 The warnings may even have helped advertising brokers, for the logical 
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inference was that they applied to other brokers, not the ones who advertised in that journal. 
The idea that newspapers had a responsibility to police their advertising columns was a 
minority view. One of the objectives of the Provincial Newspaper Society, a trade 
organization established in 1836, was to collect and disseminate information about 
advertisers and advertising agents.116 But this was with the intention of protecting members 
from imposition, rather than the public. The Society’s circular often contained warnings 
about particular brokers, warnings which members could pass on to their readers if they 
wished, but it was happy for its members to continue accepting advertisements from them, 
simply advising that they should insist on payment in advance.117 
The authority of the newspaper was exploited even more directly with “puffs,” or 
disguised advertisements, a ubiquitous facet of the nineteenth-century press.118 Papers, 
particularly provincial ones, frequently published copy written by businesses in their news 
columns without any indication of its origin, a trade arranged via reputable London 
advertising agencies. Outside brokers made great use of this service for it was doubly useful, 
not only for the puff itself, but also for the opportunity it gave to quote from the puff in 
advertisements, creating the appearance of a chorus of approval.119 Though some newspapers 
levied a premium of 25 per cent for leaving out the crucial word “advt,” the costs were far 
from prohibitive, the Staffordshire Sentinel apparently charging just a shilling a line, while 
puffs in financial newspapers could be had for as little as £2 a time.120 Puffs also took other 
forms, such as recommendations to invest with a particular broker in the “Answers to 
Correspondents” column, or even celebrity interviews with recommended brokers.121  
Moreover, even articles that were critical of outside brokers sometimes blurred rather 
than clarified moral distinctions between insiders and outsiders. For example, The Economist 
admitted that time bargains in the Stock Exchange were no different in principle from wagers 
in an outside brokerage.122 Moreover, it recognized that some of what went on in the House 
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“cannot be termed straight,” and that the “dodges” of “some of the less reputable members … 
might almost make a respectable ‘bucket shop’ blush,” such as unloading “rotten securities” 
onto their clients.123 Commentators frequently drew attention to the Stock Exchange’s failure 
to reform itself and modernize its business practices, despite a Royal Commission report 
which had recommended reforms in 1878.124 The Saturday Review, for example, complained 
that the Stock Exchange enforced “obsolete” and “antiquated” rules, which added 
“extravagantly” to the costs borne by clients.125 This meant that it was quite possible to 
criticize bucket shops but still value the competition they offered as a “corrective for 
powerful but defective monopolist institutions.”126 
Conflicting views could thus be found across the range of the newspaper press and 
within individual titles. The idea of a newspaper speaking with a coherent voice only 
gradually developed with the onset of the “new journalism” of the late nineteenth century. 
Recognizing Victorian newspapers as miscellanies of different, often contradictory, voices 
which the reader, rather than editor, was expected to interpret, is crucial to understanding the 
task facing investors.127 Wondering why “some people insisted on ignoring the advice 
appearing almost daily in the press, and continued to hand money to bucket-shop keepers” 
downplays the contradictions that characterized the market for information and advice, and 
the emotional dynamics underpinning investment.128  
 
 Competition or Collaboration? 
 
Although relations between insiders and outsiders were often antagonistic, there were also 
intersections between the two markets.129 While it was notorious that the money used to 
speculate on the cover system was not actually invested in the stocks concerned and was 
merely used to gamble on prices, some of this money did make its way into the House, for in 
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cases where an outside broker faced heavy liabilities on a particular stock, he could choose to 
“hedge” with an inside broker.130 When it came to the outsiders’ investment business, there 
were also ways for insiders to benefit. Not all securities were traded on the London Stock 
Exchange, and because of their ability to advertise, outside brokers were better placed than 
insiders to negotiate securities for which there was not a ready market, making them a handy 
go-between when a client wanted to buy or sell such a stock.131 And when outsiders did 
investment business in shares that were quoted on the London Stock Exchange, the only way 
they could do this was with inside brokers on a commission-sharing basis, which effectively 
cast them in the role of touts for the insiders. At a time when growing numbers of member 
brokers stretched business very thinly, this extra source of income was particularly valued.132 
As one commentator noted, outside business brought “grist to the mill of many an inside 
broker who would otherwise have none … many of the inside brokers absolutely depend for 
their livelihood upon the business brought to them by the outside brokers.”133 Another 
commentator also noted this growing interdependence, observing that “many firms, including 
some of reputed high standing, are not only willing, but eager” to secure this business.134  
Though it is difficult to quantify the scale of their dealing with any confidence given 
the potential unreliability of their own numbers, the outsiders were clearly becoming a 
significant presence on the market. Despite 1893 being a “disastrous” year on the Stock 
Exchange, Gregory seemed unaffected, choosing this moment to enlarge his headquarters, 
which occupied 5,000 square feet by the end of the year.135 He was employing 100 clerks by 
this time, and boasted that “[t]he trade of a day frequently involves the handling of English 
and American Railway shares to the amount of half a million of pounds sterling.”136 He 
claimed to have 20,000 clients on his books, at a time when one of the largest inside firms 
had around 3,000, numbers which enabled him to declare himself “the biggest stockbroker on 
earth.”137 It was not surprising that more than a few insiders wanted a piece of the action. In 
26 
 
1893, the managing director of the Exchange Telegraph Company, Captain W. H. Davies, 
claimed that his outside subscribers did business with a total of 294 member brokers, dealing 
in £53 million of stock. One large outsider employed 20 members to do his business on the 
Stock Exchange, another had 15. While Davies had an interest in emphasizing the extent of 
cooperation in order to dissuade the London Stock Exchange from cutting off the outsiders, 
the numbers were based on a thorough inquiry by the agents of the company and verified 
with reference to the subscribers’ books.138  
Indeed, the relationship between the outside and inside markets became closer as 
some outsiders attempted to use their volume of business to move prices. In spring 1889, for 
example, Gregory ran a sustained campaign to drive up the price of East London Railway 
Consolidated Stock, with his ads urging readers to “SQUEEZE THE BEARS,” “CORNER 
THE BEARS,” and “BUY EAST LONDON ORDINARY AND DEMAND DELIVERY.”139 
Market reports observed how the price of East Londons was rising, “owing to purchases 
effected by ‘outside’ brokers,” though not to the extent that Gregory had hoped.140 By this 
time, it was not unusual for City columns to note the impact the activities of outsiders was 
having on the market, causing sudden upward movements or relapses.141 Rumours of the 
failure of any of the larger outside firms could temporarily depress prices.142 
The outside market could seemingly withstand any scandal or failure, even involving 
the largest of its players. When Gregory died suddenly of pneumonia in 1897, it emerged that 
he had in fact been trading pseudonymously.143 His real name was Ashley Cronmire, which 
he had changed after his brother, Sidney, also a stockbroker, was criminally convicted of 
fraud in 1886.144 The case showed how easily old identities could be discarded and new ones 
crafted in print, and the fate of his business, which collapsed into insolvency after his death, 
underlined the precarity of the outsiders’ business.145 Ironically, the insolvency was widely 
attributed to the success of his last tip, Great Easterns, which had risen far beyond his 
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predictions, leaving him unable to pay his clients.146 After the failure “a great mistrust arose 
among the public” against outsiders, yet the business did not stay down for long, flourishing 
in the Edwardian period, when even critical journalists recognized the outside broker as 
constituting “a notable factor in the financial mechanism.”147  
Outside brokers thus took a prominent place in the increasingly complex ecology of 
the City, which saw growing numbers of outside participants, including banks, investment 
trusts, and the London offices of foreign financial institutions.148 A revealing indicator of 
their influence was the number of rival agencies that started offering similar services and 
using similar methods, in the process blurring the boundaries between different types of 
financial actor. Banks began advertising their stock and share dealing services much more 
aggressively, and while they were not mistrusted to the same extent, this “touting for 
business” cast them in a comparable role to the outside brokers.149 Though the banks – like 
many outside brokers – brought their business to the House, their power was considered 
problematic by some. Provincial brokers were particularly concerned that banks allowed 
investors to bypass them when accessing the London market, one Liverpool broker arguing 
that “many Banks in the Provinces practically came within the definition of outside Brokers 
… they were in fact Bucket Shops.”150 Brokers on the London Stock Exchange also had 
reservations, one complaining in 1909 that many were “now practically the salaried clerks of 
the Banks, who were in reality acting as Stock Brokers.”151 It was not only banks that were 
acting as alternative entry points to the stock market: even department stores were getting in 
on the act, with Whiteley’s opening a stock and share dealing department for its customers 
before the start of the Great War.152 
The fact that outside brokers sometimes established their own newspapers had begun 
to blur the boundaries between brokerage and journalism, and this process accelerated when 
the financial press started offering their readers stock and share dealing services. The 
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Financial World’s Stock and Share Agency, established in 1888 and dealing in “Mining, 
Brewery, Tramway, Omnibus, and Miscellaneous Shares,” was an early example.153 While 
these were creating alternative markets to the London Stock Exchange, other services sought 
to funnel money into the official market. An example was The Critic, which established a 
stock and share agency for clients who did not feel confident dealing direct with a broker. For 
an annual fee of five guineas, clients could select the member broker they wished to do their 
business, and the agency would handle all transactions, including checking the broker’s 
statements.154 Newspapers had long been a platform for trading, carrying advertisements of 
stocks and shares for sale or wanted.155 But the idea reached its apogee in 1912 with the 
opening of the Daily Mail Stock Exchange, a service to match buyers and sellers. The scheme 
prompted the ire of members, particularly as it was sold to the public using the methods of 
the bucket shop, the Daily Mail telling readers that it allowed them to bypass “the cumbrous 
organisation of the Stock Exchange, with its brokers’ commissions and jobbers’ profits.”156 
And, as with the bucket shops, some members thought that the Exchange Telegraph 
Company should be ordered to cut its supply of prices to the Northcliffe press.157 Thus, if the 
London Stock Exchange itself was slow to imitate the outside brokers’ techniques for 
expanding the market, a variety of outside agencies were bringing these methods further into 




By highlighting the role of outside brokers in the development of the securities market, this 
article has sought to emphasize the importance of looking beyond official institutions and 
actors when studying the history of capitalism. As Kenneth Lipartito and Lisa Jacobson 
argue, understanding capitalism’s complex ecosystem involves “interrogating the relationship 
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between the manifest and the hidden, the mainstream and the marginal, and the licit and the 
illicit.”159 These other markets are not simply “appendages” to the “real” market, but can 
intersect with it, and influence how it operates and develops. It therefore makes sense, as Rob 
Aitken contends, to conceptualize these “fringe” markets “not as a space external to the 
conventional world of finance, but as a kind of border zone that is neither fully inside nor 
separate from that world.”160 Opening up these fringe markets for exploration helps us to 
rethink boundaries, relations, and practices in the history of capitalism.  
Stepping outside the Stock Exchange provides a fresh, if unfamiliar, view of the 
development of investment and speculation in Britain, allowing us to subvert dominant 
narratives. Historians have contrasted the “[a]ggressive marketing campaigns” of the New 
York Stock Exchange in the early twentieth century with the lack of similar efforts in London 
“to promote shareholder democratization.”161 Widening our focus to include the outsiders 
presents an alternative picture, allowing us to identify the aggressive marketing that was 
democratizing Britain’s financial markets from the 1870s. Despite their enduring association 
with fraudulent practices, outside brokers were more than simply the London Stock 
Exchange’s shadowy “others,” whose poor reputation served to legitimize the official 
markets. In fact, their blanket advertising, prolific branching, and mass production of 
financial advice were instrumental in popularizing investment.  
 Recognizing this encourages us to explore hitherto neglected likenesses between 
consumer and financial markets in Britain. Rather than conceiving of these as distinct, we can 
reframe stocks and shares as another of the markets being transformed by innovative 
Victorian entrepreneurs seeking to reach untapped ranks of consumers by new methods.162 
Labelled “quacks” by their opponents, outside brokers were indeed applying the methods of 
the patent medicine trade to financial products.163 When the outsiders made the process of 
speculation as simple as filling out a newspaper coupon – as Redway, Furness, and Co. had 
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by 1909 – it is clear that they were disrupting boundaries between the stock market, consumer 
society, and the “new journalism” in ways that have been underappreciated.164 By sanitizing 
speculation and making it more accessible, they packaged “playing the market” as one of the 
new forms of commercialized leisure that could be enjoyed by late Victorians. Though there 
were many casualties, there were also beneficiaries, such as the elderly Nonconformist 
minister who, when interviewed by a reporter inside a bucket shop, “confessed that he had 
had a ‘flutter’ on the Stock Exchange every day for many years, and felt quite miserable 
without the mild excitement.”165 Such remarks bring out the emotional appeal of the stock 
market, which was able to generate a frisson of hazard in a society where lotteries were 
illegal, and other forms of gambling were becoming heavily restricted. Though many of their 
clients would never appear in a shareholder register, the outside brokers were responsible for 
drawing an unquantifiable number of Victorians into the stock market. 
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